This paper analyzes market capacity expansion in the presence of intertemporal consumption externalities such as consumer learning, networks, or bandwagon effects. The externality leads to an endogenous shift of market demand that responds to past market capacity. Whereas market capacity grows in waves, its magnitude depends on the degree of market concentration. The competitive environment contributes to S-shaped time patterns of market capacity expansion that is slow from the social viewpoint. On the other hand, using an introductory price, a monopolist plans an initially larger, but eventually smaller, amount of market cultivation than a competitive market capacity expansion. JEL Classifications Code: D11, L11, L14.
Introduction
In a number of successful product or services markets, the level of market demand often increases over time. One of the significant features of this growth is that it is gradual rather than instantaneous. Although different explanations are possible for this gradual expansion, there is an important but relatively neglected reason in the literature: an intertemporal consumption externality where market demand is endogenously determined as an increasing function of past market capacity, defined as the number of consumers who buy the product. Several reasons exist for such an externality. First, there may be consumer learning.
An increase in past market capacity leads to an accumulation of product information among consumers and to an updating of consumer preferences. Second, indirect network externalities may exist 1 . The variety of complementary products is an increasing function of the number of past product users (for example, computers and software). Another reason, which is purely psychological, is the bandwagon effect. Consumers often wish to consume a popular product. They may regard past market capacity as a sign of popularity 2 .
When an intertemporal consumption externality exists, the market equilibrium contains dynamic aspects: market capacity increases in waves. More importantly, market capacity expansion may be highly dependent on the degree of market concentration. Intuitively, market concentration enables firms to efficiently expand the market by internalizing the externality, but also earn a large, socially inefficient level of profits. In contrast, the competitive environment restricts firm profits but makes the internalization of the externality difficult. It is apparently ambiguous how these differences affect the level, time pattern, and product price of the market capacity expansion. The main aim of this paper is to theoretically examine the relation between market concentration and the properties of the market capacity expansion in the presence of an intertemporal consumption externality.
In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of market capacity expansion with endogenous market demand in an infinite-horizon framework. The market demand increases with increases in the previous period's market capacity because of an intertemporal consumption externality. We examine two types of market capacity expansions: a competitive (decentralized) market capacity expansion and a monopoly (centralized) market capacity expansion. In the competitive market, small and identical firms enter the market responding to each period's demand growth given the equilibrium price determined by the zero profit condition. In contrast to competitive firms, a monopolist has the ability to control price. This ability enables the monopolist to control both the level of current market capacity and future demand growth because of the internalization of the externality. By increasing current market capacity, the monopolist generates a large amount of subsequent period demand. However, an increase in current market capacity reduces current profits. The main difference between the two market capacity expansions is whether the intertemporal trade off between current revenue and future demand growth exists or not.
The two market capacity expansions differ with respect to the levels, the time patterns, and the equilibrium prices, respectively. Assuming that the degree of demand growth (the benefit of an externality) decreases with increases in the previous period's market capacity, the analysis provides several interesting results. First, the competitive market capacity expansion is initially slower and smaller than the monopoly market capacity expansion. However, it gradually becomes faster and larger in the long run. Because of the externality, the competitive market capacity expansion is slow and inefficient from the social viewpoint. In contrast, the monopolist plans a profit structure in order to earn large profits from a large market demand by sacrificing early profits. The monopolist has an incentive for a large amount of early market cultivation by internalizing the externality. This leads to faster market capacity expansion than in the competitive market. However, the monopolist slows down the rate of market cultivation to yield large profits by restricting market capacity.
Second, the initially slow competitive market capacity expansion has an S-shaped time pattern that is reported by a number of researchers who investigate the time patterns of a number of firms 3 and products 4 .
In contrast, monopoly market capacity expansion has difficulty in following the initial convex part of the S-shaped time patterns. The intuitive logic for the difference in the initial time patterns is as follows. In the competitive market, the attractiveness of a new entry is determined by the strength of its externality 3 See, for example, Gort and Klepper (1982) who investigate the time patterns of a number of firms in 46 product markets. Note that S-shaped diffusion is not an isolated phenomenon. Empirical evidence shows that the time patterns of the intra-firm and inter-firm technology diffusion processes also tend to be S-shaped: see the seminal work of Griliches (1957), Mansfield (1968) , and the survey of technological diffusion by Stoneman (2002) . For a discussion of the theoretical mechanism of adoption of new technology, see Jensen (1982) and Rengnum (1981) . 4 S-shaped product diffusion is treated as a stylized fact in the marketing literature. It is observed in a number of markets such as color televisions (Karshenas and Stoneman (1992) ), fax machines (Economides (1995)), and clothes dryers (Krishnan, Bass, and Jain (1999) ). This phenomenon is also observed in the services market in the presence of network externalities such as the mobile telecommunications services market and the Digital Subscriber Line services market. effect. A strong externality effect makes a current period entry more profitable than in the previous period and it raises the attractiveness of the new entry. This leads to the initial convex part of the S-shaped time pattern. On the other hand, a strong externality effect also raises the monopolist's benefit of internalizing the externality. This provides the monopolist with a strong incentive for a large amount of early market cultivation in order to generate a large amount of demand sooner. Therefore, the initial market capacity expansion by the monopolist is less likely to increase, but more likely to maintain, the concave time patterns.
Finally, the two market capacity expansions also differ with respect to the equilibrium prices. Whereas the competitive equilibrium price is constant over time, the monopolist has an incentive to initially offer a low introductory price 5 . The initial low introductory price contributes to the large amount of early market cultivation by the monopolist. The eventual high price induces the monopolist to generate large profits with the larger demand. This paper is related to a number of literatures. First, this paper is most relevant to the industrial organization literature concerned with market capacity expansion in the presence of intertemporal externalities. The majority of previous studies on market capacity expansion are related to firm learning: learning by doing (Jovanovic and Lach (1989) ), learning consumer demand (Rob (1991) ), and two sided learning between consumers and firms (Bergemann and Välimäki (1997) and Vettas (1998) ). S-shaped diffusion has been explained in these literatures. In contrast, this paper does not focus on the role of firm learning, but focuses on the role of the consumption externality.
In the literature on firm learning, Vettas (2000) analyzes market capacity expansion with an intertemporal consumption externality. He shows that the competitive diffusion path becomes S-shaped and that it is always slower than the optimal path by a planner or a monopolist. In his model, however, the benefits of market concentration are overestimated because the monopolist does not have an incentive to restrict output because of perfectly elastic demand: the demand curve is a horizontal straight line. In addition, the perfectly elastic demand induces his model to require firm learning for gradual market diffusion 6 and 5 A number of studies state that introductory pricing is possible when network externalities exist (Rohlfs (1974) , Shapiro (1985, 1986) , and Cabral, Salant, and Woroch (1999)). In addition, an introductory price has been theoretically observed in the optimal pricing of experience goods (Schmalensee (1982) , Shapiro (1983) , and Bergemann and Välimäki (2006)) and to gradually raise prices. In the marketing literature, Krishnan, Bass, and Jain (1999) analyze the optimal pricing strategy for new products based on the Bass model and show the role of introductory pricing. 6 If firm learning does not exist, market capacity expansion becomes instantaneous. The structure of firm learning in his model builds on Rob (1991) .
develops an unnatural relation between market capacity and prices: while monopoly market capacity is larger than for the competitive case, monopoly price is always higher 7 . In contrast, the demand here has a more common structure: the demand curve is a downward sloping line and leads to gradual diffusion without firm learning, the inefficient properties of monopoly diffusion, and the natural relation between the price and the market capacity.
Furthermore, this paper is related to the literature concerned with consumption externalities. One of the established literatures concerned with intertemporal consumption externalities is rational addiction where a consumer's utility is positively related to the volume of own past consumption (see Becker and Murphy (1988) ). Frank (1989) studies an intertemporal effect where consumers' own past experience affects present consumption from a perspective of relative consumption. While these literatures do not focus on the role of social learning on a consumer's preferences, social learning also leads to intertemporal consumption externalities (see Banerjee (1992) , Bikhchandai, Hirsheifer, and Welch (1992), Ellison and Fundenberg (1993) , and MacFadden and Train (1996)). Becker (1991) studies restraint pricing where consumer demand is positively related to market capacity, and Caminal and Vives (1996) analyze the importance of past market share as a signal of product quality 8 . The model in this paper builds on these points of view 9 . Assuming the existence of an intertemporal consumption externality, this paper explores how it affects market capacity expansion depending on market concentration.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 introduces the concept of competitive equilibrium and analyzes its properties: the existence of S-shaped diffusion. Section 4 sets up the social planner problem and shows that competitive market capacity expansion is slow from the social viewpoint. Section 5 sets up the monopoly problem and compares the competitive market capacity expansion with the monopoly case. Section 6 contains concluding remarks. The proofs of all results are provided in the Appendix. 7 In contrast to our model, an increase in current market capacity does not lower market price, but raises future prices in the case of perfectly elastic demand. In addition, as stated by Rob (1991) , monopoly market capacity is always larger than in the competitive case because of the informational externality generated by the firm's learning. Therefore, a larger monopoly capacity leads to higher market prices. 8 See also Doganoglu (2003) who examines dynamic price competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly market. 9 In the marketing literature, the modeling of S-shaped product diffusion relies largely on so-called "epidemic" models established by Bass (1969) . See Mahajan, Muller and Bass (1990 Bass ( , 1995 . In such models, information of a new product is assumed to spread from users to nonusers by personal contact. This social interaction may provide an explanation of intertemporal consumption externalities in this analysis. Therefore, this paper may be regarded as a complementary economic analysis of this marketing literature.
Model
This section develops the model. We characterize the consumers' behavior in 2.1 and the firms' behavior in the competitive market in 2.2. We assume that time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. It is also assumed that the market in this paper is a perishable good market or a services market in which the service fee is charged in every period.
Consumers
There are a number of mass unit consumers for all periods. Each consumer has a different preference for a product. Let θ be the type of consumer, which is stationary for all periods and is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. The market capacity, the number of consumers who purchase the product, at period t is denoted by q t . The consumers' willingness to pay depends on the previous period's market capacity because of the intertemporal consumption externality. We assume the following reservation price for type θ consumer at periods t = 1, 2, .., v t (θ):
where σ(q t−1 ) represents the intertemporal consumption externality, which has two properties. First, σ ′ (q t−1 )
> 0 implies that each consumer's reservation price at period t is strictly increasing in the previous period's market capacity. Second, σ ′′ (q t−1 ) < 0 implies that the increase in the reservation price, or equivalently the benefit of the externality, is strictly decreasing in the previous period's market capacity. Of course, there may exist a locally increasing part especially at smaller market capacities but it is unrealistic that the increasing part would be observed for larger market capacities. This assumption guarantees that there is a unique upper limit for market capacity for every market capacity expansion in this analysis 10 .
A consumer of type θ pays p t for a product and enjoys consumer surplus of v t (θ) − p t . The consumer is assumed to purchase the product if and only if consumer surplus is nonnegative, i.e., v t (θ) − p t ≥ 0.
Then, the inverse demand function at period t, P(q t−1 , q t ), becomes:
for all t = 1, 2,.., and 0 ≤ q t−1 ≤ 1. It is easy to see that the inverse demand function is strictly increasing in the previous period's market capacity, but strictly decreasing in the current period's market capacity.
Firms under Competitive Environment
Firms in the competitive market are identical, small and price takers. At the beginning of each period, the set of firms is composed of two subsets associated with potential entrants and incumbents. There is assumed to be no asymmetry of information between the two subsets and to be no demand uncertainty. At the beginning of each period, potential entrants decide whether to enter the market or not, and incumbents decide whether to exit the market or not. Potential entrants enter the market with entry cost c > 0, which is the initial investment in purchases such as machines. We assume that machines are durable and are operated for multiple periods. Machines can be operated at any level between zero to one unit for each period in an environment of constant return to scale. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the scrap value of machines is zero and the marginal cost is zero.
Let x t be the number of incumbents at period t, y t the number of new firms entering the market at the beginning of period t. Because the entry cost is not recoverable and the marginal cost is zero, incumbents do not have an incentive to exit the market. Therefore, y t = x t − x t−1 ≥ 0 for all t = 1, 2,... Assuming that x 0 = 0, we have x t = ∑ t τ=1 y τ . Let i > 0 be a constant interest rate and the discount factor is denoted by β ≡ 1/(1 + i). For each period, firms maximize the discounted sum of future operation profits, which is denoted by R(x t−1 , y t ) 11 , i.e.:
for all t = 1, 2,,.., where p t represents the direct operation profit (market price) at period t and βR(x t , y t+1 )
represents the discounted future operation profits. Potential entrants enter the market if and only if the present value of net profits is positive, i.e., R(x t−1 , y t ) > c. If the demand is initially low and the fixed cost or the discount factor is high, then entry may not occur in the first period. The following assumption guarantees first period entry.
Assumption 2 implies that entering the market is profitable in the first period. If ρ ≤ (1 − β)c, then first period entry is not attractive and it does not occur. Because this condition holds for all following periods, the market capacity expansion never occurs.
Analysis
This section provides the characterization of competitive equilibrium and explores the existence of Sshaped market diffusion. We first characterize the competitive equilibrium in 3.1. Then, the existence of S-shaped market diffusion is examined.
Competitive Equilibrium
Each period's equilibrium condition is determined by the market clearing condition and the zero profit condition. Let r t be the number of new consumers who purchase the product at period t. Now, we define the competitive equilibrium as follows:
Definition. The competitive equilibrium consists of three sequences {p c t , r c t , y c t } that simultaneously satisfy the following conditions:
1. The market clears for all t = 1, 2,...
2. The market price is determined by the inverse demand of consumers for all t = 1, 2,...
3. New entry occurs until excess profits become zero for all t = 1, 2,...
with equality if y c t > 0.
According to the above definition, the properties of the competitive market capacity expansion are identified. From the market clearing condition, the number of new consumers, r c t is nondecreasing. In addition, from the zero profit condition and equation (3), the equilibrium price in the competitive market becomes:
for all t ≥ 1 such that y c t > 0. This implies that the equilibrium price is constant as long as the market is in the transition process and it does not depend on the externality. Given this equilibrium price, potential entrants enter the market in response to demand growth in each period. By putting the inverse demand function into equation (8), the competitive market capacity expansion is summarized as follows:
for all t ≥ 1 such that y c t > 0. Equation (9) implies that the competitive market capacity expansion is represented by a first order difference equation with respect to x c t . Denote the steady state of equation (9) by x c . Then, the dynamical system of equation (9) is summarized in Figure 1 . It is easy to see that the sequences {x c t } ∞ 0 satisfy x c t ∈ [0, x c ] for all t = 1, 2,.., and monotonicity, x c 0 = 0 and x c t → x c as t → ∞ 12 .
S-shaped Market Diffusion
From now on, we examine the time pattern of the competitive market capacity expansion and show that it becomes S-shaped (initially convex, but eventually concave) when the externality effect is initially strong enough. In terms of firm entry, S-shaped market diffusion implies that the level of new entry is initially increasing, but eventually decreasing. We first explore the determinants of the amount of new entry at each period. Then, the initial convexity and the eventual concavity of the market diffusion path are examined, respectively.
Let ∆y c t ≡ y c t+1 − y c t . The time path of the market capacity expansion becomes S-shaped if ∆y c t > 0 initially, but ∆y c t < 0 eventually. We also define the potential firms' profitability of entry at the beginning 12 By rearranging the terms of equation (9), we have:
From the properties of σ, we have 
for all t = 1, 2,... Equation (10) 
There is a unique maximizerx
Proof. See Appendix.
The single peaked property of the profitability of new entry is summarized in Figure 2 . This property follows from the features of the inverse demand function with y c t = 0, P(x c t−1 , x c t−1 ) = ρ + σ(x c t−1 ) − ρx c t−1 . An increase in the previous period's market capacity leads to two independent effects associated with the effect of demand growth because of the externality (as captured by σ(x)) and with the effect of declining market price because of the downward sloping demand curve (as captured by ρx). First, market demand is increasing in the previous period's market capacity because of the intertemporal consumption externality.
The effect of demand growth on the profitability of new entry is always positive. However, the downward sloping demand curve leads to a decline in the market price as the previous period's market capacity increases. This effect is always negative and it reduces the profitability of new entry. Therefore, the net effect on the profitability of new entry is dependant on the relative magnitude of the two effects.
From the property of σ(·), the effect of demand growth is initially stronger than that of a declining market price, and the profitability of new entry is increasing for all 0 ≤ x c t−1 <x. However, as the market capacity increases, the effect of demand growth becomes weaker and the profitability of new entry decreases for all x c t−1 >x. Its value becomes zero at the steady state, x c . As a result, Π(x c t−1 ) has the single peaked property.
The single peaked property of the profitability of new entry and lemma 1 imply that the amount of new entry increases for 0 < x c t−1 ≤x but decreases forx < x c t−1 < x c . Because market capacity is strictly increasing for all periods, it is easy to see that the time path of competitive market capacity expansion eventually becomes concave. Therefore, it becomes S-shaped if 0 < x c 1 ≤x. This condition is equivalent to σ ′ (x c 1 ) > ρ. This implies that the strong externality effect contributes to the initial convexity of the time path of competitive market capacity expansion. Moreover, the necessary and sufficient condition for the 
One of the important properties of the competitive capacity expansion is that the first period entry, (ρ − (1 − β)c)/ρ, does not depend on the externality, σ(·), but the subsequent period entry does. Therefore, the strong externality effect does not lead to a larger market capacity expansion in the first period, but it does in subsequent periods. From inequality (11) and the properties of σ(·), it is easy to see that Sshaped market diffusion is more likely to be observed under small values of initial profitability, Π(x c 0 ) = ρ − (1 − β)c, which follows from the low preference parameter, the low discount factor, and the high entry cost. Therefore, we conclude that the S-shaped time pattern of competitive market capacity expansion is observed for a strong externality effect and low initial profitability. 
Welfare
In the previous section, we showed that the competitive market capacity expansion has an S-shaped time pattern. We examine its welfare properties in this section and compare it with the monopoly market capacity expansion in the following section. We first set up a social planner problem in 4.1 and then examine the properties of a socially optimal market capacity expansion in 4.2.
The Planner's Problem
A social planner expands market capacity with expansion cost c per unit and zero marginal operation cost.
The planner maximizes the discounted sum of future welfare. Let x o t be the market capacity set by the planner at period t and y o t the amount of new capacity expansion at period t. Socially optimal planning satisfies the following Bellman Equation:
The interpretation of the above equation is that the present value of the sum of future welfare is current welfare plus the discounted next period value of the sum of future welfare. We now characterize the feature of the social optimum market capacity expansion as follows: 
Proposition 2. Let x o be the market size in the steady state of the social planner problem and η
where R( Equation (13) shows that the marginal expansion cost is equal to the marginal social benefit at the socially optimal plan. The right hand side is the marginal expansion cost. The left hand side is the marginal social benefit, which is composed of two elements. The first term represents the discounted sum of future revenue. The second term indicates the social benefit from the internalization of the externality;
increased current sales increase the subsequent period's market demand.
Optimal Capacity Expansion
Note that the only difference between the competitive market capacity expansion and the socially optimal market capacity expansion is whether to internalize the social benefit from the externality or not. From the social viewpoint, it is more efficient to design a market capacity expansion taking into consideration an increase in the subsequent period's demand as a result of increased current sales. On this point, the competitive market capacity expansion is socially inefficient.
Let p o t be the shadow price of the product in the planner's problem. From equation (13), it is denoted by:
for all t ≥ 1 13 . Note that the equilibrium price in the competitive market does not depend on the strength of the externality effect and it is constant for all periods, i.e., p c t = (1 − β)c for all t = 1, 2, ... On the other hand, the shadow price in the planner's planning depends on the strength of the externality effect and changes responding to the strength of the externality effect. It is easy to see that it is lower than the equilibrium price in the competitive market. This property leads to the socially efficient market capacity expansion, which is faster than the competitive one: Proof. See Appendix. 13 The last inequality follows from the assumption σ(1)
Moreover, the two market capacity expansions differ according to their time patterns. Whereas the externality does not affect the first period's market capacity expansion in the competitive market, it does under socially optimal planning. The strong externality effect makes the competitive market capacity expansion initially too slow from the social viewpoint and initially convex. On the other hand, it leads to an initially large market capacity under optimal planning and makes the S-shaped time pattern more difficult to obtain.
Comparing Competitive Diffusion and Monopoly Diffusion
In this section, we examine how the market capacity expansion differs depending on the degree of market concentration. We first set up the monopoly market capacity expansion in 5.1. Then, we compare it with the competitive one in 5.2.
The Monopolist's Planning
A monopolist is assumed to expand market capacity with expansion cost c per unit and the zero marginal operation costs. The monopolist maximizes the discounted sum of future profits. Let x m t be the market capacity by the monopolist at period t and y m t the amount of new capacity expansion at period t. The profit maximization problem is summarized by the following Bellman equation:
The interpretation of the above equation is that the present value of the sum of future profits is composed of the current profit and the discounted next period profit. The following proposition characterizes the monopolist's planning. Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4. Let x m be the market size in the steady state under the monopolist's plan and γ
Equation (16) implies that the marginal expansion cost for the monopolist is equal to the marginal benefit, which is composed of three elements. The first term on the right hand side of equation (16) is the present value of the sum of direct future revenues. The second term is the discounted value of the future benefit in which an increased current market capacity raises subsequent period demand. The last term represents a marginal loss of current revenue. This term is regarded as the current benefit, in which the decreased current market capacity raises the current revenue.
The last two terms represent the intertemporal trade off with respect to the market cultivation strategies of the monopolist. From the discounted future benefit, the monopolist has an incentive to lower the current market price and increase current market capacity. This incentive coincides with the social planner's incentive to maximize social welfare. However, the monopolist has the incentive to raise the current market price and to reduce output because of the current benefit. Therefore, the optimal planning by the monopolist is determined by the magnitude of both benefits.
Initial Efficiency and Eventual Inefficiency of Monopoly Diffusion
The comparison of both market capacity expansions starts from the initial market capacity expansions.
Then, the eventual market capacity expansions are examined. Note that the only difference between both market capacity expansions is that the monopolist faces an intertemporal trade off.
Let p m t be the monopoly equilibrium price at period t. It is denoted by:
for all t = 1, 2, ... It is easy to see that the monopoly equilibrium price is endogenously determined by the intertemporal trade off between the discounted future benefit and the current benefit. By comparing (8) with (17), the monopoly equilibrium price at the current period is lower (higher) than the competitive one if the net benefit of increasing current output is positive (negative). Because the inverse demand is strictly decreasing in the current market capacity, the larger (smaller) monopoly capacity is observed as long as the previous monopoly market capacity is at least as large (small) as the previous competitive market capacity. Proof. See Appendix.
Note that the higher value of the discounted future benefit arises in the environment of a strong externality effect, σ ′ (x m t ), the large new market capacity expansion in the subsequent period, y m t+1 , and the low discount value, β. On the other hand, the degree of the current benefit, ρx m t is constant under the current market capacity. Therefore, we conclude that the monopoly market capacity is larger than the competitive one in the early periods because the externality effect is decreasing over time and y m t+1 is initially large 14 . Next, we compare the eventual capacity expansions in the both markets. As the market capacity increases, the net benefit of increasing the current market capacity decreases and the monopoly equilibrium price increases. The following lemma shows that the net benefit of increasing the current market capacity becomes negative in the steady state. Proof. See Appendix.
From lemma 3, it is easy to see that the monopoly equilibrium price in the steady state is higher than the competitive one by comparing equations (8) and (17) . This implies that the monopolist has an incentive to slow down the market cultivation and to eventually earn positive profits. The following proposition shows that the slow downed monopoly market capacity expansion leads to a smaller market size in the steady state than for the competitive market capacity expansion. Proof. See Appendix.
The characteristic monopoly equilibria 15 may explain the low introductory price. In the presence of the intertemporal consumption externality, it is optimal for the monopolist to reduce the initial profits 14 Whereas the concavity of σ(x) contributes this result, this result holds even if the externality effect is constant, i.e., σ ′ (x) = σ < ρ. In this setting, the discounted sum of the future benefit in the first period is denoted byσ[x 2 is positive, the monopoly market capacity expansion is initially faster than the competitive one if ρ −σ is close to zero. 15 The results here differ from the results of Vettas (2000) . The monopoly price in Vettas is dependent only on the previous period's market capacity because of perfectly elastic demand: an increase in the monopolist's output does not lower price. In the equilibrium, the large amount of market capacity in the previous period raises prices and revenues. In this environment, the by using the introductory price, and to start to earn larger profits with higher demand and a higher price in the earlier periods. If the externality effect is initially strong enough, the monopolist earns negative profits in the initial periods, but soon obtains strong demand growth. It is interesting to recognize that the monopolist's incentive to cultivate the market initially leads to a socially more efficient output level than the competitive market under a strong externality effect. Furthermore, the above results provide some implications about the time pattern of the monopoly market capacity expansion. As well as the socially optimal capacity expansion, the first period monopoly market capacity expansion is influenced by the externality. In addition, it eventually leads to a smaller market size than the competitive one. Therefore, the monopoly market capacity expansion in the first period is relatively larger than the competitive one. It tends to be concave and has the greatest difficulty of the three market capacity expansions in becoming S-shaped.
Conclusion
This paper presents a dynamic model of market capacity expansion where the market demand endogenously shifts in response to the previous period's market capacity because of an intertemporal consumption externality. We explore how the degree of market diffusion depends on the market structures with respect to its levels, time patterns, and prices. The major results reported here are summarized as follows.
First, the competitive environment leads to a constant equilibrium price, which is not influenced by the externality. This contributes to the S-shaped time pattern of market capacity expansion. In addition, the competitive market capacity expansion is socially inefficient and initially too slow because it does not internalize the benefit of the externality through the market price. Therefore, subsidies for initial entrants can be an effective policy.
On the other hand, market concentration enables the firm to control the market price by internalizing the effect of the externality. The monopolist has an incentive to initially cultivate the market at a fast pace using a low introductory price and eventually earn large profits with higher levels of demand. Whereas this strategy leads to negative profits initially, it is optimal because the monopolist generates high levels of market demand sooner. monopolist has no incentive to restrict the current market capacity, but has an incentive to increase it instead. In addition, the monopoly market capacity is efficient and larger than the competitive one because of firm learning. As a result, the monopoly market capacity is efficient and larger than the competitive one, while the monopoly price is higher.
Whereas the model has ignored the impact of heterogeneous firms, demand uncertainty, technological progress, and strategic behavior, which mainly impact the producer, these elements may be important issues for market diffusion. However, our concern here is to examine how market diffusion differs between market structures when an intertemporal consumption externality exists, and to provide an alternative explanation of S-shaped market diffusion and a low introductory price as simply as possible without these elements. Therefore, this paper is to be regarded as a complement to these issues.
There are the several issues requiring future work. First, the empirical importance of the intertemporal consumption externality and the relation between market capacity expansion and market concentration.
In addition, this paper ignores the aspect of oligopolistic market diffusion. My conjecture is that an oligopolistic market capacity expansion is faster than the monopoly, but slower than the competitive market, and that its time pattern is likely to be S-shaped as the number of firms increase. Finally, there is concern over how general our results are. While the analysis here is couched in terms of a parametric example, the results may extend to more general settings. We hope this study helps researchers address these issues.
Proof of Proposition 1
Because the competitive diffusion path eventually becomes concave, it becomes S-shaped if and only if 
Putting x c 1 = [ρ + (1 − β)c] into this inequality and rearranging terms, we have inequality (11) .
Proof of Proposition 2
Note that there is a second order difference equation and one initial condition, x o 0 = 0. By using a phase diagram, we show that there exist unique sequences, {x o t } ∞ 0 , which satisfy (i) for all t = 1, 2, .., We first show that there exists a unique x o > 0. On the steady state,
Let T (x) = ρx − σ(x) − βσ ′ (x). It is easy to see that T (x) is strictly increasing in x > 0 such that T (x) > 0.
Therefore, there exists a unique x o > 0.
To analyze the property of equation (13) further, we transform equation (13) into an equivalent system in the (x o t−1 , x o t ) space. Solving (13) with respect to x o t+1 , we have:
for all t = 1, 2, ... Note that equation (22) 
for all t = 1, 2, ... By using Taylor's formula, the linearized system around x o is denoted by:
for all t = 1, 2, ... Then, the characteristic equation becomes: 
for all t = 1, 2, .., where the first inequality follows from U 2 (x t−1 , x t ) < 0 and the second inequality 
Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose in negation that x c ≤ x m . This implies that Π(x m ) ≤ 0. But this contradicts the steady state condition:
Therefore, x c > x m .
